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660 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
SOVEREIGN LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF ITS 
WARDS OCCASIONED BY FAILURE TO EXERCISE 
PROPER CUSTODIAL CARE 
Periodically the public reads of the injury of a citizen other 
than a state employee at the hands of a former mental patient 
who either escaped because of inadequate guarding or was re-
leased from a state or federal institution because of an improper 
release-diagnosis. The public assumes that the injured party will 
be reimbursed, but who will bear the burden of reimbursement? 
Confinement often leaves the patient judgment-proof; the em-
ployee whose negligence allowed the escape is frequently judg-
ment proof; the employee who negligently certified the release of 
an unrehabilitated patient is clothed with immunity from suit on 
his release-discretion;1 and in a vast majority of jurisdictions 
the courts are closed to tort actions against the sovereign.2 
Realizing the inequities of the above situation, Nebraska has 
1 60 Stat. 845 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) provides: 
"Any claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty .... "; St. George 
v. State, 283 App. Div. 245. 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150 (3d Dep't 1954); 
Schwenk v. State, 205 .Misc. 407, 129 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Ct. Cl. 1953). 
:! It is a general rule that the sovereign cannot be sued in tort without 
its consent. .McCartney v. State, 156 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946). This 
case cites as a foundation of the doctrine, the case of Hans v. Louisiana, 
134 U.S. 1 (1890). This rule has been abrogated in New York. N.Y. 
Court Claims Act § 2. It has been eliminated in the federal jurisdiction. 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 Stat. 842-847 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1346, 2671-2678 (1952) provides: "The United States shall be liable, 
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances .... " Eighteen states have waived their immunity to suit. 
These waivers apply generally to ( 1) contracts or (2) torts arising out 
of the state's proprietary capacity. Anderson. Claims Against States, 7 
Vand. L. Rev. 234, 241 (1954). 
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provided for a legislative tort claims board.3 In addition, bills to 
establish state liability in situations where the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior would make a private employer liable for the 
torts of his employees have been introduced into the last two 
sessions of the Nebraska legislature.-! 
Both bills were defeated, u but opposition was to the proce-
dure and not the principle; and in light of the national trend, the 
eventual passage of a Nebraska tort liability act seems quite prob-
able. 6 Therefore, it is hoped that this note will provide the fol-
lowing: (1) an analysis of problems concerning mental hospitals, 
which have been experienced by other jurisdictions under their 
tort claims acts; acts which will serve as a pattern for legislators 
to follow in drafting Nebraska's tort immunity waiver, (2) a 
guide for Nebraska courts which will be called upon to interpret 
such an immunity waiver, and (3) a guide for practitioners be-
fore and members of the present Nebraska Sundry Claims Board. 
I. THE CUSTODIAL DUTY 
A. Duty 
Under the New York Court of Claims Act, which is similar 
3 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-857 (Reissue 1950) (Sundry Claims Board); 
for claims related to a prisoner's tortious acts which have been allowed, 
see Neb. Laws c. 93, p. 720 (1951) (car damage and loss of clothing 
when kidnapped by escaped prisoners); Neb. Laws c. 202, p. 660 (1947) 
(articles taken by two convicts and injuries inflicted by an escapee from 
the State Reformatory). For additional examples of claim boards. see 
Anderson, Claims Against States, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 234, 239 (1954). 
-1 Legislative Bill 334 was introduced in the sixty-sixth session of the 
Nebraska legislature. The bill provided for suit against the state on 
" ... claims ... caused by negligence or wrong of a state officer or em-
ployee acting in the scope of his employment in cases where the state, 
if a private person, would be liable .... " It was considered and indefin-
itely postponed. Legislative Bill 350, worded identically with its prede-
cessor, was introduced into the sh.i;y-seventh session of the Nebraska leg-
islature. This bill was killed in committee. 
u Ibid. 
6 There has been strong agitation for the waiver of tort immunity by 
states. Borchard, Tort Claims against Government: l\Iunicipal, State and 
Federal Liability, 33 A.B.A . .T. 221 (1947); Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort 
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363, 1414 (1954); Note, State 
Liability Acts, 6 Baylor L. Rev. 135 (1953); l\Iunnecke and Gold, Does 
the King Pay for Tort in Pennsylvania?, 12 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 198 (1951); 
Note, Liability of State for Tortious Acts of its Employees, 5 Miami L.Q. 
515 (1951); Kuchel, Should California Accept Tort Liability?, 25 Calif. 
S.B . .T. 146 (1950); Note, Governmental Immunity for Suit and Liability 
in Texas, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 337 (1949); Note, Governmental Tort Liability 
in Indiana, 23 Ind. L . .T. 468 (1948); Note. State Immunity from Tort 
Liability, 8 Mont. L. Rev. 45 (1947). 
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to the proposed Nebraska legislation,7 the New York courts have 
imposed upon state mental institutions the same custodial duties 
as are imposed upon private institutions by the common law. 
Thus the state has a duty (1) to protect mental patients and visi-
tors within state institutions from the tortious acts of dangerous 
mental patients,8 (2) to protect the mental patients from self-in-
flicted harm or self-destruction,9 and (3) to protect the individual 
members of society from the tortious acts of escaped mental pa-
tients.10 
In contrast, although the Federal Tort Claims Act (F.T.C.A.) 
subjects the federal government to tort liability in the same man-
ner as a private individual would be liable,11 a specific provision 
i The New York act states: "The state hereby waives its immunity from 
liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have 
the same determined in accordance with the rules of law as applied to 
actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations. . . ." 
Nebraska's proposed act reads: . in cases where the state, if a 
private person, would be liable .... " 
:< Scolavine v. State, 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E.2d 174 (1947) (assault of 
fellow-inmate); Flaherty v. State, 296 N.Y. 342, 73 N.E.2d 543 (1947) 
(duty described but recovery denied); Rossing v. State, 47 N.Y.S.2d 262 
(Ct. Cl. 1944) (visitor injured); Joachim v. State, 180 Misc. 963, 43 
N.Y.S.2d 167 (Ct. Cl. 1943) (visitor injured). For cases involving pri-
vate institutions see Sylvester v. Northwestern Hospital, 236 Minn. 384, 
53 N.W.2d 17 (1952) (assault by fellow inmate); University of Louisville 
v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907). 
fl Burman v. State, 188 Misc. 153, 67 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Ct. Cl. 1947) 
(death by exposure after escape); Shattuck v. State, 166 Misc. 271, 2 
N.Y.S.2d 353 (Ct. Cl. 1938) (loss of legs from exposure after escape). 
For cases involving private institutions, see Le:idngton Hospital v. White, 
245 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1952) (injuries while escaping); Fowler v. Norways 
Sanitorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415 (1942) (self-destruction); 
Dahlberg v. Jones, 232 Wis. 6, 285 N.W. 841 (1939) (exposure after 
escape); Paulen v. Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 N.W. 162 (1939) (self-
inflicted injuries); Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 174 Atl. 
81 (1934) (self-destruction); Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 
643, 171 S.E. 192, aff'd, 180 Ga. 595, 180 S.E. 137 (1933) (injury while 
escaping); Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P.2d 228 (1932) 
(injury while escaping). 
10 Benson v. State, 52 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ct. Cl. 1944) (burning of a barn); 
Jones v. State, 267 App. Div. 254, 45 N.Y.S.2d 404 (3d Dep't 1943) 
(assault on person outside walls after escape); Weihs v. State, 267 App. 
Div. 233, 45 N.Y.S.2d 542 (3d Dep't 1943) (stabbed a women after es-
cape). For cases involving private institutions, see Torrey v. Riverside 
Sanitarian, 163 Wis. 71, 157 N.W. 552 (1916) (duty present but re-
covery denied). 
11 60 Stat. 845 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b). 2671-2680 
(1952); Van Zuch v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); 
Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Vir. 1953). 
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of the act excludes claims arising out of an assault and batteryP 
This section has been interpreted to exclude claims which arise 
when a guard's negligent supervision gives an inmate the oppor-
tunity later to assault a claimant.13 The federal government's duty 
in this area is limited to (1) the protection of its mental patients 
from self-destruction or harm14 and (2) protection of mental pa-
tients and individual members of society from negligent, as con-
trasted to intentional, injuries received at the hands of an escaped 
mental patient. 
The federal court's interpretation of the "assault and bat-
tery" exception has been criticized on the grounds that it has 
created artificial and inequitable distinctions in this and other 
areas of possible sovereign liability.15 In light of this criticism 
and the success which the New York courts have experienced with 
their waiver statute, which does not have an assault and battery 
exception, it is urged that the Nebraska legislators refrain from 
burdening any proposed waiver statute with the assault excep-
tion. 
B. Standards of Care and Violations thereof 
The inherent unpredictability of the mentally ill when coupled 
with the tensions and strains of confinement can create a danger-
ous potential. Thus, an institution's primary standard of care 
is based on the general character of its patients and the nature 
of the institution.16 
In addition, if an institution has notice of a mental patient's 
especially dangerous propensities, it is charged with a secondary 
standard of guarding against such propensities.1i The New York 
12 60 Stat. 842-847 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952) pro-
vides: "The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this 
title shall not apply to . . . (h) any claim arising out of assault, battery 
" 
13Wilcox v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
H United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952). 
15 Note, Torts-Federal Tort Claims Act-Exception as to Assault and 
Battery, 34 Neb. L. Rev. 567 (1955). 
16 Restatement, Torts § 319 (1934) (those in charge of persons hav-
ing dangerous propensities should control them to prevent the person 
from rendering possible harm to third persons); Jones v. State, 267 App. 
Div. 254, 45 N.Y.S.2d 404 (3d Dep't 1943) (failure to exercise degree 
of care reasonably required in view of the mental condition of some of 
the inmates). 
1; Rossing v. State, 47 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (Ct. Cl. 1944). The court 
stated, "The degree of care which the law exacts from those in charge 
of institutions for the insane towards its patients is such reasonable care 
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courts have held that individual laxity in guarding,18 use of im-
proper methods of restraint,19 inadequate supervision caused by 
over-crowding and understaffed conditions,20 and the failure of 
one section of a mental institution to notify other sections of the 
institution of a patient's dangerous propensities21 are all viola-
tions of the standard of care. 
An institution's standard of care is based on the nature of 
its inmates, and the standard may vary with the methods em-
ployed to discover the nature of these inmates. The New York 
cases have set up a vague requirement of discovery by employing 
such terms as "propensities which are known or should have 
and attention for their safety and the safety of others as their mental and 
physical condition. if known, may require, and should be in proportion to 
the physical or mental ailments of such patients." Weihs v. State, 267 
App. Div. 233, 45 N.Y.S.2d 542 (3d Dep't 1943). In Shattuck v. State, 
166 Misc. 271, 273, 2 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356 (Ct. Cl. 1938) the court stated, 
". . . In this court we held that the first escape was notice to the hos-
pital authorities of the patient's propensities in that regard, and that 
they should have heeded the warning and taken measures to prevent the 
subsequent escape. . . ." 
ts Joachim v. State, 180 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Ct. Cl. 1943). 
For cases involving private institutions, see Lexington Hospital v. White, 
245 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1952) (left alone without proper surveillance de-
spite known eloping tendencies); Paulen v. Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 
N.W. 162 (1939) (nurse momentarily ceased to watch patient after hav-
ing unlocked screen); Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 17 4 
Atl. 81 (1934) (attendant on constant watch went to get some break-
fast). 
19 Fowler v. Norways Sanitorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415 
(1942). 
20 Scolavino v. State, 297 N.Y. 460, 7 4 N.E.2d 17 4 ( 1947) ( 68 patients 
in a disturbed ward with only two attendants, and no effort made to keep 
patients under constant observation); Burtman v. State, 188 Misc. 153, 
67 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Ct. CI. 1947) (hospital had insufficient help which caused 
supervision of recreation area to be inadequate, thereby allowing an escape); 
Rossing v. State, 47 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Ct. Cl. 1944) (Institution was approx-
imately 40% overcrowded. One attendant in "disturbed ward" of 56 
inmates. "The overcrowding of the hospital and the failure to have a 
sufficient number of attendants in charge of these patients who were 
known at times to be violent ... " caused the' situation.); Benson v. 
State, 52 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ct. CI. 1944) (patient assigned to outside detail 
under untrained gardener who had not been informed of the patient's 
tendencies); Jones v. State, 267 App. Div. 254, 45 N.Y.S.2d 404 (3d 
Dep't 1943) (135 patients in distrubed ward with only one attendant; 
management failed to take precautions against fact that key was missing). 
21 Benson v. State, 52 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ct. CI. 1944). 
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been known,"22 "from past experience"23 and "in light of their ex-
perience."24 It has never been held that the institutions are re-
quired to take notice of any more than the mental patient's acts 
within the institution. Thus, where a mental patient's danger-
ous tendencies have been dormat during incarceration, the in-
stitution's standard of care is negligible since the institution's 
discovery methods will not pinpoint the possible danger. 
A much more realistic method of discovery would be to re-
quire an extensive institutional investigation of each patient's pre-
confinement background through such sources as interviews of 
relatives, questionnaires to home town police and schools, F.B.I., 
and similar reports. 
C. Liability for Failure in Custodial Duties 
The test of a New York institution's liability for its em-
ployee's negligence is well defined in Shattuck v. State, where 
the court stated: 
.Although claimant's injuries were the immediate result of 
exposure in severely cold weather, the negligence of the state 
was the proximate cause, as its wrong started in motion a se-
quence of events which could have been readily foreseen and 
which in no way were deflected or changed by the intervention 
of any independent forces • . . .2;:; 
Under this test the New York courts have held that it is 
foreseeable that an inmate will (1) do unreasonable things, (2) 
take advantage of opportunities to escape, (3) effect escape by 
violence if necessary, and ( 4) vent destructive urges on persons 
or property after his escape ;26 and thus have held the state liable 
for negligence. The foreseeable risk has been held not to include 
an epileptic drowning in a horsetank when overcome by a seizure 
while doing ordinary daily chores around an institution,27 or an 
escaped inmate being struck and killed by a train while he was 
wandering down a railroad track.28 
22 Joachim v. State, 180 Misc. 963, 967; 43 N.Y.S.2d 167, 171 (Ct. Cl. 
1943). 
23 Flaherty v. State, 296 N.Y. 342, 346, 73 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1947). 
24 DiFiore v. State, 275 .App. Div. 885, 888, 88 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 
(3d Dep't 1949). 
25166 Misc. 271, 274, 2 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356 (Ct. Cl. 1938). 
26 See notes 8, 9, and 10 supra. 
271\IcPartland v. State, 277 .App. Div. 103, 98 N.Y.S.2d 665 (3d Dep't 
1950). 
28 Calabria v. State, 263 .App. Div. 1056, 34 N.Y.S.2d 820 (4th Dep't), 
aff'd, 289 N.Y. 613, 43 N.E.2d 836 (1942). 
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II. THE REHABILITATIVE DUTY 
A. The Duty 
Both the New York and the federal courts have stated that 
the incarceration of the mentally-ill is for a double purpose: for 
the protection of society from the dangerous tendencies of the 
mentally-ill and for the rehabilitation of the patients so they may 
return to society as useful citizens.29 The effectuation of the 
latter requires a determination by some governmental employee 
.of the time when it is advisable, from the standpoint of both socie-
ty and the inmate, to place the inmate into immediate contact 
with society; viz, the release discretion. 
:!f• Schwenk v. State, 205 Misc. 407, 129 N.Y.S.2d 92. 99 (Ct. Cl. 1954); 
Excelsior v. State, 296 N.Y. 40, n9 N.E.2d 553 (1946). By statute the 
state of New York has a duty to release an inmate when he is deemed 
sane. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-340 (1943) the state must release 
when the inmate is "cured." By negative inference it could be argued 
that the state has a duty not to release an inmate until he has recovered 
or at least is no longer a danger to society. See N.Y. Mental Hygiene 
Law § 87(1), (3). Section 70 of this law uses the words "care" and 
"treatment." See also Neb. Rev. Stat.§§ 83-306, 307. 307.01 (1943) which 
speak in terms of "care and treatment" and "rehabilitation." These words 
might imply a duty upon the state and a liability to individual members of 
society for a failure to treat inmates properly. This duty is also founded 
upon protective, financial, and humanitarian principles. Besides protec-
tion of society from maladjusted individuals and elimination of the self-
destructive anxieties of the menally ill, the financial policies supporting 
the duty of rehabilitation are avoidance of the cost of (1) apprehending 
and re-confining the mentally ill and ( 2) losing productive citizens. 
There have been only two federal cases involving the release of an ap-
parently unrehabilitated mental patient. Smart v. United States, 111 F. 
Supp. 907 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 
430 (N.D. Ala. 1949). Both cases denied recovery. It appears that 
the federal courts have adopted the "duty of rehabilitation" as a de-
vice to modify the duty of protection. This device is illustrated in two 
New York cases where it was held that the state's duty of protection to 
society must be sacrificed to the state's duty of rehabilitation. Schwenk 
v. State, 205 Misc. 407, 129 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Ct. Cl. 1953); In Excelsior v. 
State, 296 N.Y. 40, 46, 69 N.E.2d 553, 556 (1946) the court said, "A 
balance must be struck between contending interests-(1) the state's 
duty to take care of its mental defective wards with an eye toward re-
turning them to society more useful citizens, and ( 2) the state's con-
cern that the inmates of the institution cause no injury or damage to 
the property of those in the vicinity. That balance may be hard to achieve. 
We keep within settled legal principles, however, if the State is held only 
to a duty of taking precautions against those risks 'reasonably to be per-
ceived' . . . and if the community assumes the risk of accidental loss or 
damage to property by an inmate of an open institution .... " 
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There is a general divergence of opinion among psychiatrists 
as to their ability to determine accurately at what point an in-
mate is rehabilitated or to predict accurately whether he will re-
vert to his maladjustments.30 However, the long-range financial 
and humanitarian benefits which society receives from the re-
lease of those inmates showing strong signs of probable recovery 
justify the exercise of the release-discretion, and an Bmployee 
making an honest error in the use of this release discretion is 
immune from suit.31 And under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior the state will not be liable if the employee is not. 
The F.T.C.A. does not make a distinction between an honest 
error in judgment and a negligent error in judgment; both, by 
specific exception, are excluded as a basis for tort suits against 
the government.32 The same result has been reached in New 
York by judicial interpretation of its tort claim act.33 The allow-
ance of immunity to an official 'Yho negligently exercises his dis-
cretion has been severely criticised.3-1 Also, the justification for 
such allowance is further reduced in this particular area by the 
wide latitude which is given, in light of the uncertainty of diag-
nosis, to the definition of an honest error in judgment. There-
30 United States v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 563 (3d Cir. 1951) (a psy-
chiatrist testified, " ... I have seem them [schizophrenics] stay well for 
twenty years and I have seen them relapse within a year .... " A 
poll conducted by a New Jersey commission of seventy-five prominent 
psychiatrists reveals " ... that it is impossible to predict the occurrence 
of serious crime with any accuracy." N.J. Report Comm'n on the 
Habitual Sex Offender 14, 58 (1950). Some of these psychiatrists esti-
mated that they could be 75% to 90% accurate in predicting future 
criminality among sex deviates; but others believed they could make a 
definite prognosis in only 5% of the cases, and a number of the au-
thorities expressed the belief that no accurate prediction could be made 
at all. Glueck, Mental Disorders and the Criminal Law 354 (1925) 
asserts, "The recovery rate [in schizophrenic cases] is extremely low. 
It [schizophrenia] may lead to almost any conceivable crime." Cf. Note, 
Nebraska Statutory Revision of Punishment of Sex Offenders, 33 Neb. 
L. Rev. 475 (1954). 
31 St. George v. State, 283 App. Div. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150 
(3d Dep't 1954). 
32 60 Stat. 845 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) provides: 
".Any claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . . ." 
33 St. George v. State, 283 .App. Div. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147 (3d Dep't 
1954); Schwenk v. State, 205 Misc. 407, 129 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Ct. Cl. 1953). 
34 Note, Tort Liability of .Administrative Officers in New York, 28 St. 
Johns L. Rev. 275 (1954); Note, Tort Liability of Public Officers in 
Tennessee, 21 Tenn. L. Rev. 315 (1950); Note, Tort Liability of Public 
Officers and Employees in Ohio, 9 Ohio St. L.J. 501 (1948). 
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fore, it would seem that a test of "reasonable use of discretion" 
should be used to determine whether the state and the employee 
are liable. 
The underlying basis of an employee's immunity from suit 
for the exercise of his release discretion is the thought that with-
out such immunity the employee would fear numerous, unfounded 
suits concerning the use of his discretion and that he would, there-
fore, fail to exercise his discretion, thus def eating the purpose of 
the rehabilition program; i.e., the release of rehabilitated inmates 
at the earliest possible moment. A possible solution which would 
retain the benefits of the above immunity and yet would provide 
a remedy for a claimant would be to make the state liable for 
the negligent release granted by its employee and yet leave the 
employee immune to suit. This would necessitate changing the 
basis of liability from respondeat superior to that of strict liabili-
ty in these specific circumstances. It is submitted that this ac-
tion is justified in view of the state's control of its employee's 
conduct through careful hiring, managing, training, and dismissal. 
This solution would place the cost of maintaining a rehabilitation 
program with its attendant risks of inaccurate discharges, a cost 
properly attributed to the cost of government, on society as a 
group instead of burdening individual members of society who 
are injured by such inmates.35 
However, assuming that respondeat superior is the basis of 
a tort claims act and that there is an unlimited discretionary im-
munity, there is the further question of the extent to which this 
immunity will clothe other negligent acts of the sovereign. As-
sume that a psychiatrist makes an incorrect diagnosis of an in-
dividual because of incorrect and inadequate information supplied 
to him. Or assume there is a correct diagnosis but inadequate 
supervision of the inmate while the inmate is on convalescent leave 
or parole. Will the discretion of the psychiatrist immunize negli-
gent acts committed prior and subsequent to the exercise of the 
discretion? The answer to this question must be considered in 
the light of recent federal and New York decisions and additional 
public policy considerations. 
In Smart v. United States a veteran's hospital released a 
mental patient for a trial visit to his home.36 On his way home he 
stole a car and negligently injured the claimant. The claimant 
argued that the hospital was negligent by not adequately super-
3ti Ibid . 
.:io 111 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Okla. 1953). 
NOTES 669 
vising the patient after he was released. The court denied liabi-
lity on the grounds that both the release and post-release super-
vision were discretionary. Thus, discretion blanketed subsequent 
negligent acts of an inmate. This holding is in line with Dalehite 
v. United States,37 which established the proposition that once 
discretion of a federal employee is exercised, all subsequent negli-
gent acts of other employees are likewise clethed with immunity. 
In Kendrick v. United States38 a manager of a veteran's hospi-
tal and his psychiatrists jointly recommended the discharge of 
an inmate who later killed the claimant's decedent. The court 
held that the manager and psychiatrists could not be held liable 
since their acts were performed in strict accordance with the regu-
lations by which they were governed. It might be inferred from 
the Kendrick case that had there not been strict compliance with 
the regulations prior to the use of the discretion, the government 
might have been held liable. But this inference is negated by 
Mid-Central Fish v. United States.39 The petitioner brought an 
action to recover for damages to his premises caused by flood 
waters. He alleged injury because of his reliance upon inaccu-
rate weather reports of the United States weather bureau. The 
reports were inaccurate because of negligent gathering and an-
alyzing of weather information. In dismissing the action, the 
court stated: 
... it is not material whether the agency or the employee used 
reasonable care in ascertaining the facts on which such judg-
ment was founded . . . we believe that all data of whatever kind 
or character coming to the knowledge of the "agency or em-
ployee" upon which its discretion and judgment is premised falls 
within the intendment of the discretionary duties there exempted 
by Congress. Thus, though an "agency or employee" of the Gov-
ernment may be negligent in accumulating data upon which a 
"discretionary duty" is performed, it would appear to fall with-
in the ambit of the above exception . . . .40 
Thus discretion may be construed to immunize all wrongs even 
though a correct assembling of facts would have resulted in a 
correct report. 
In St. George v. State 41 an inmate on convalescent leave from 
a New York mental institution stabbed seven persons, fatally 
37 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
38 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949). 
39112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mo. 1953). 
40 Id. at 798, 799. 
41283 App. Div. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147 (3d Dep't 1954). 
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wounding four. The claimant alleged that the incorrect diagnosis 
of the inmate was caused by ·the failure of the institution's staff 
to present crucial information to the psychiatrist who made the 
diagnosis. The trial court found that there had been negligence 
in gathering the information and held for the claimant even 
though there was a later use of discretion based upon this in-
formation.42 The appellate court reversed on the facts, finding 
no negligence in the gathering of the information, and held that 
the release was merely an error in judgment for which the sover-
eign could not be held liable.43 The ultimate decision on this 
case, however, is in doubt since it is still on appeal.44 It would 
seem that while the case was reversed on its facts, and despite 
contrary federal decisions, the logic of the trial court's holding 
is valid in light of policy considerations which will be discussed 
in a later section. 
B. Failure in the Rehabilitative Process 
If the discretionary immunity is to cover all negligent as 
well as honest errors in judgment and all subsequent and prior 
negligent acts, then there is no need to analyze what is a reason-
able standard of care in the field of rehabilitation. However, if 
the discretionary immunity doctrine can be limited, either by leg-
islation or judicial interpretation, so as to expose the above negli-
gent acts to attack, the claimant must then surmount the prob-
lem of whether the sovereign exercised a reasonable standard of 
care in releasing the inmate. In determining whether the sover-
eign deviated from a reasonable standard, there are two main 
criteria-custom and proposed standards by experts. 
While the nation's mental institutions have essentially the 
same problems, the methods used by each vary according to (1) 
the local public's evaluation of the relative desirability of the cust-
odial and rehabilitation functions and (2) the institution's fin-
ancial appropriations. 
Despite these problems of variance, the claimant may intro-
duce evidence of methods used in similar institutions, or the 
sovereign may introduce the methods of similar institutions to 
prove compliance with such customary standards. This evidence 
becomes conclusive as to reasonable conduct if no adverse evi-
42 203 Misc. 340, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1953). 
43 283 App. Div. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147 (3d Dep't 1954) (under New 
York appellate procedure for tort claims, both fact and law are reviewed, 
N.Y. Laws c. 860 § 24 (1939). 
H 307 N.Y. 869, 120 N.E.2d 860 (1954). 
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dence is introduced.4 r; However, custom, notwithstanding its long 
established usage, is not infallible since either party may point 
out that the customs of similar institutions were not in fact 
reasonable. 46 
The unreasonableness of the sovereign's methods may be 
proved by utilizing experts who testify as to what the standards 
should be. Expert standards can be obtained through such a 
publication as "The Mental Health Program of the Forty-Eight 
States"47 or through the provisions of the "National Mental Health 
Act."48 These sources supply both statistics and comments on 
uniformity and validity of state and federal practices. However, 
such evidence could not show the sovereign was negligent in not 
using the latest and most progressive methods if the methods in 
use in the institution were already in fact reasonable.49 
Instead of the present system of obtaining evidence of a 
reasonable standard of care from the various conflicting juris-
dictions, a system of specific standards of administrative proce-
dure could be incorporated into the governing statutes on mental 
institutions. This would supply both the institution and claimant 
with a norm of reasonable conduct, thus restricting the area of 
investigation and bringing about a corresponding reduction in the 
expenses of litigation in this area. It is submitted that if a tort 
claims act is passed in Nebraska, the legislature should also amend 
the governing statutesu0 of the mental institutions to provide for 
a detailed description of minimum administrative procedures for 
(1) gathering information on an inmate, both inside and outside 
the institution, (2) transmitting this information to the psychia-
trist who makes the release diagnosis, and (3) supervising in-
mates after release. 
45 Virginia Stage Lines v. Newcomb, 187 Va. 677, 47 S.E.2d 446 (1948); 
Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club, 173 Pa. Super. 179, 
96 A.2d 181 (1953); Blake v. Fried, 173 Pa. Super. 27, 95 A.2d 360 
(1953). 
4GSaglimbeni v. West End Brewing. 274 App. Div. 201, 80 N.Y.S.2d 
635, 83 N.E.2d 18, 338 U.S. 892 (1948); Uline Ice v. Sullivan, 187 F.2d 
82 (D.C. Cir 1950); Reagh v. San Francisco Unified School District, 259 
P.2d 43, 119 Cal. App. 2d 65 (1953); Blake v. Fried, 173 Pa. Super. 27, 
95 A.2d 360 (1953); Witherspoon v. Haft, 157 Ohio St. 474, 106 N.E.2d 
296 (1952); Kuemmel v. Vradenburg, 239 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. 1951). 
47 The Council of State Governments (1950). 
48 58 Stat. 691 (1946), 42 u.s.c. §§ 241, 242(a), 245 (1952). 
49 Lee v. Pennsylvania R.R., 192 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1951); Virginia 
Stage Lines v. Newcomb, 187 Va. 677, 47 S.E.2d 446 (1948) (practical 
method). 
50 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 83-101 to 83-123 and 83-305 to 83-360 (1943). 
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C. Liability for a Fa,ilure in the Rehabilitative Process 
Only one court has applied the "anticipated risk" test where 
the state has failed to rehabilitate a mental patient. In the St. 
George case51 a released mental patient, four days after his re-
lease, brutally attacked seven persons, killing four of them. The 
court allowed recovery. However, the difficulty in applying the 
"anticipated risk" test to individual fact situations is illustrated 
by the following summary of a mental patient's history as pre-
sented in United States v. Baldi.52 
There, prior to his entrance into the Army, the subject had a 
long history of larceny, drug usage, drinking, and confinement in 
institutions. While he was in the Army, he suffered from a "nerv-
ous condition." After his discharge he stole an automobile and 
was sentenced to a New York hospital. He was released from 
this hospital as "recovered" despite a three-one decision of the 
staff physicians that he was still insane and not ready for re-
lease. Subsequent to this release he stole a car, and was caught, 
convicted, and sentenced to a penitentiary. One month after his 
release from the penitentiary, he was committed to another pri-
son. Shortly after his release from the prison, he stole a gun 
and killed a person. 
If a court were to find that, in light of the three-one decision 
that he was still insane, the discharge of the inmate was negligent 
and not within the discretionary immunity of the state, should the 
state be held liable for the inmate's (1) stealing a car some four 
months after release, (2) stealing a gun some two years after re-
lease, or ( 3) the killing of a person two years after his release? 
Under the "anticipated risk" test, it could be argued that the 
negligent release of an insane person whose record included al-
coholism, larceny, auto theft, marijuana, and homicidal tendencies 
would involve the risk that he would again commit these or like 
crimes after his release. However, his incarceration in another 
mental hospital and his sentences to two prisons could be con-
sidered "intervening" factors which were the true proximate cause 
of the injuries inflicted by him. In addition, are the crimes so 
remote as to be outside the orbit of the anticipated risk? These 
are some of the problems to be answered in future cases. In 
answering these questions many policy factors must be considered. 
51 203 Misc. 340, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596 (ct. Cl. 1953). 
52192 F.2d 540, 561 n.39 (3d Cir. 1951). 
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D. Public Policy Considerations 
Let us assume that a claimant has been injured by a negli-
gently released or supervised inmate. Unless there are compel-
ling arguments against recovery, it appears inequitable to force 
the injured claimant to sustain a larger proportion of the finan-
cial J:mrden of the state's rehabilitation program than his fellow 
taxpayers. 
It is argued that to allow recovery would cause the state to 
be reluctant to release inmates. As a result there would be un-
necessary confinement of inmates who could be returned to society 
as useful citizens. 53 But in all probability the financial costs of 
unnecessary confinement would force the state to release inmates, 
since unnecessary confinement leads to overcrowded conditions 
and resulting higher expenses. In contrast, the cost of maintain-
ing an inmate on convalescent leave or parole is negligible when 
compared to the costs of confinement. Also, overcrowded con-
ditions may result in increased escapes, assaults, and other torti-
ous acts which burden the state financially. Furthermore, the 
sovereign may be able to recover partial indemnity against the 
negligent employee.54 Therefore, faced with this financial di-
lemma, the state is more likely to carry out the mandate of its 
statutes-rehabilitation and the release of rehabilitated inmates-
than to confine them unnecessarily. 
III. CONCLUSION 
A. The Custodial Duty 
The federal courts' interpretation of the "assault and bat-
tery" exception in the F.T.C.A. produces unnecessary and un-
desirable restrictions on tort recoveries against the government, 
while the New York statutes and interpretations thereof have 
reached a more equitable and logical result. Therefore, it is 
urged that the Nebraska legislature refrain from placing such 
exceptions in any tort claims act which might be adopted. Ad-
ditionally, in order that reasonable measures may be taken to 
guard adequately against an inmate's dangerous propensities, it 
would be well for the legislature to revise the governing statutes 
of mental institutions contemporaneously with the passage of a 
claims act so as to provide a method which insures that full eval-
uation of an inmate will be made through the use of F.B.I., Red 
Cross, and family questionnaires. 
53 See Schwenk v. State, 205 Misc. 407, 129 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Ct. Cl. 1953). 
M 8 Miami L.Q. 655 (1954); 29 St. John's L. Rev. 145 (1954). 
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B. The Rehabilitatfon Duty 
The "discretionary immunity" provisions of the F.T.C.A. and 
the New York courts' interpretation of that state's act has un-
duly blanketed (1) the sovereign's employee's negligent release 
diagnosis, (2) prior negligence in gathering information to be 
used as a basis for the employee's release diagnosis, and (3) neg-
ligent supervisory acts committed subsequent to the exercise of 
the release discretion. It is submitted that the Nebraska legisla-
ture should limit an individual employee's discretionary immunity 
to reasonable acts, as contrasted from negligent acts. If the leg-
islature is not willing to subject the employee who exercises the 
release discretion to liability for his negligent acts, the legislature 
should specifically provide that the state will be liable for these 
acts despite the limitations of the doctrine of respondeat super-
ior. 
In supplementing the above provisions, the legislature should 
specify in the governing statutes of state mental institutions the 
standards of reasonable administrative procedures that should 
govern those acts which are prior or subsequent to the release 
discretion ; viz, such standards as are proposed by the "Mental 
Health Program of the Forty-Eight States" or by "The National 
Mental Health Act." A violation of these standards would be 
negligence per se since their purpose would be to provide a guide 
of reasonable conduct. 
C. Futwre Ramifica.tions 
It must be noted that the rehabilitative duty, which both 
the New York and federal courts have used to restrict the right 
of protection of individual society members, is a duty which is 
owed exclusively to the sovereign and not to the individual. Over 
the short span of a generation, psychiatry and psychology have 
made great advances toward the accurate diagnosis and prognosis 
of the mentally maladjusted. Rehabilitation has grown from an 
ideal to a positive and workable process whereby many of the 
mentally ill are returned to society as useful citizens. As psy-
chiatry and psychology delve still deeper into the nebulous area 
of human behavior, the word "rehabilitation" will take on a more 
concrete form. It is possible that this will cease to be a duty 
owed only to the state and, instead, will become a legal obligation 
owed to the inmate to convert him within a reasonable time from 
a maladjusted individual into a useful citizen. However, this 
latter cause of action by an inmate against his keepers will re-
main unborn until (1) society's apathy and misunderstanding of 
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the mentally ill is replaced by enlightened concern over the care 
and cure of these unfortunates, and (2) psychiatrists and psy-
chologists are able to diagnose, cure, and prognosticate both men-
tal and criminal behavior to a much higher degree than is now 
possible. Only then will the courts interpret the duty of rehabili-
tation as a concrete cause of action. 
The Nebraska legislature should take cognizance of this possi-
ble field of recovery. The federal courts have interpreted the 
F .T.C.A. to exclude the claims of prisoners,:;:; and this interpre-
tation has been severely criticized. ;;G While it is doubtful that 
such an interpretation can be extended to other wards of the 
state, the legislature should take care to eliminate the possibility 
of such an inequitable result by specifically providing that any 
ward of the state can file a claim under the state tort claims act. 
Charles K. Thompson, '56 
